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Editor’s Note
Don’t be fooled: the joke on our front cover does not mark
the dumbing down of CentrePiece. This bumper issue of
the magazine addresses serious topics in a serious way, in
keeping with the standards established from the start. But
adopting a serious approach doesn’t mean we have to
abandon our sense of humour; nor should it prevent us
from trying to reach a wider audience. Indeed, one of the
principal aims of CentrePiece is to make the work of those
at the Centre for Economic Performance accessible to
many more people than might usually be inclined to read
about economics. If an eye-catching front cover attracts
new readers, it will be worthwhile.
Besides raising a smile (we hope) our cover emu adver-
tises the fact that this is a special issue on Europe. With
economic and monetary union due to start in little over a
year; with negotiations on enlarging the European Union
getting under way next year; and with many countries in
Europe still struggling to get themselves on the path
towards political stability and economic prosperity, we’ve
brought together a range of contributors to explore these
issues.
Michael Emerson offers some provocative thoughts about
the new Europe, while Richard Jackman sounds a note of
caution about monetary union. Diego Puga examines the
challenge facing the EU as it works to reform its regional
policy: finding more effective ways of helping the poorer
member states – and regions – catch up with the more
prosperous, while preparing the way for an ambitious
enlargement of the Union. 
Youth unemployment is not, of course, a Europe-specific
problem. But it is such an important topic that I wanted to
include it in this special issue, especially given that the
authors, David Blanchflower and Richard Freeman, both
associates of the CEP, are so well-known for their ground-
breaking work in this area.
For this special issue we have three outside contributors.
Two leading British politicians, Austin Mitchell, Labour MP
for Grimsby, and Edwina Currie, a Conservative MP until
the last election, offer their thoughts on Britain’s future in
Europe. Sir Alan Walters, formerly economic adviser to
Margaret Thatcher, writes about Black Wednesday five
years on.
In his regular column, Danny Quah looks at the potential
long-term impact on Europe’s boundaries of economic
weightlessness.
All in all, then, another issue which underlines the breadth 
of the Centre’s expertise and the quality of the work 
done here. The pieces in this extended issue are longer in
response to feedback which we’ve had – and which is
always welcome. Tell us if we are making the work of 
the Centre for Economic Performance more accessible: 
if we’re not, tell us why not. Planning is already well
advanced for next year’s issues – so get writing!
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2Europe is changing fast
– as rapidly as at any
time in its history. But
are Europe’s institutions
able to keep pace? 
The CEP’s Michael
Emerson offers a
provocative analysis.
T
he summer of 1997 saw a series of crucial summit
meetings – in Amsterdam, Madrid and Denver – all
concerned with the shaping of the Europe of the
twenty-first century. The coincidence of the collapse
of Communism in Europe and the drive towards closer
integration within the European Union has concentrated
minds on the need to adapt institutional and political struc-
tures for the next century. The speed of change can often
seem painfully slow. That might be less important if those
forcing change through were always clear about the direc-
tion they were moving in; and those changes commanded
widespread approval. Where is Europe heading?
The deadly past
The map of Europe has been redrawn with remarkable
frequency over the past thousand years, and particularly the
last century. As Europe enters the new millennium the
challenge is clear: to break with tradition by bringing about
change peacefully, without involuntary changes in frontiers.
Europe holds the world record for violent conflict. In the
twentieth century, the continent accounted for more than
two thirds of the one hundred and ten million war-related
deaths; a further fifty four million civilians fell victim to
Stalin’s regime in the Soviet Union. And Europe continues to
demonstrate an extraordinary capacity for its peoples to
switch between rich multi-cultural integration and savage
inter-ethnic conflict. There are more than a hundred
instances of significant ethnic groups living as minorities in
their own countries. The defeat of Communism unleashed
pent-up demands for minority rights; but Northern Ireland,
the Basque province of Spain, and Cyprus are all reminders
that the problem is pan-European.
The cost is not measured solely in terms of lives lost. World
wars and local conflicts cause devastating economic
damage for the regions affected. More than half the entire
capital stock was lost in Bosnia and Chechnya: GNP fell by
80% at the height of these conflicts. Public spending in
Northern Ireland is 60% higher than in the rest of the UK;
Turkish-occupied Cyprus is an underdeveloped territory,
while the southern Republic has a GNP per capita compa-
rable to Spain.
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Security and economics hand in hand
All this underlines the extent to which security questions in
Europe have an economic dimension, and the extent to
which the different sets of institutional relationships in
Europe inevitably – and rightly – overlap. In the wake of the
transition from Communism in such a large part of Europe,
economists now recognise how much more than the right
economic policy prescription is needed to ensure economic
progress. There is the need to provide credible prospects
for prosperity through democracy and the rule of law, in
order to quash latent propensities for inter-ethnic conflicts.
Just in economic terms, this is essential to avoid the costly
episodes of destruction seen in the recent past.
But there is, increasingly, a second requirement: to offer
clear rewards for civic behaviour and sound corporate
governance in order to overcome the endemic corruption
and criminality in some of the still-newly liberated countries
of Eastern Europe. At stake here is the difference between
continuing economic stagnation and a growth rate sufficient
to catch up with average European living standards within,
say, twenty years.
Institutional maps
Several institutions are involved in the process of change:
their powers often overlap; and they all have an increasing
tendency to work with flexible groups of participants. The
European Union is currently pushing ahead with plans to
introduce a single currency among most, but not all, of its
fifteen members in 1999. At the same time, it is embarking
on perhaps the most ambitious enlargement programme in
its history; negotiations start with several countries next year,
raising the prospect of a Union of twenty or more members
early in the next century. The EU is also planning to extend
its spheres of operation to various aspects of security policy.
Yet one of the key developments in this area, the Schengen
Group, does not count every EU state among its members
and allows some non-EU states to opt in.
Meanwhile, NATO – which some thought would become
obsolete with the end of the Cold War – is itself developing
radically, and rapidly. The invitation to join NATO, extended
to several former Warsaw Pact nations at the 1997 Madrid
summit meeting, was coupled with closer cooperation with
Russia – not itself on the list of new members. And new
functions have been acquired along the way – a role in
lesser, intra-regional conflicts, with a new capability, the
Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), to carry it out. But the
CJTF can operate as part of NATO or leased to the Western
European Union.
And then there are the two organisations with wider
spheres of membership: the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of
Europe. These bodies are addressing fundamental
questions of security and civil society. But their areas of
competence are confused and overlapping; and they only
have modest powers.
The rules of civil society: political...
The distribution of powers is illustrated below. The various
European institutions are, in effect, concerned with what we
might call the eight sets of rules for European civil society.
Four of these are political, four economic. Some are closely
defined, others less so.
Curiously, the most fundamental set of rules, governing
democracy, is also the least well-defined in officialdom. The
Council of Europe monitors democratic institutions, and
both the EU and NATO make democracy an absolute pre-
condition of membership, which provides powerful leverage
on applicant countries. Apparently one can recognise
democracy when one sees it.
Human rights, by contrast, are codified with great precision
in the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. This has been successful in large
measure because of the enforcement activity of the
European Court for Human Rights. Codified rights for
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Political, security
1. Democratic institutions Council of Europe, EU
2. Individual human rights Council of Europe, EU
3. National minorities OSCE, Council of Europe, EU
4. Inter-state behaviour UN, OSCE, NATO, WEU, EU
Economic, social 
5. Market for products and factors WTO, EU
6. Macroeconomics IMF, EU/Euro
7. Social model Council of Europe, EU
8. Corporate governance EBRD
The Maastricht criteria, in
particular limits on budget
deficits and national debt, 
are already influencing 
the domestic economic policies of EU
members, even those unlikely or unwilling 
to join EMU in the first wave. 
EIGHT SETS OF RULES FOR A EUROPEAN 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
minorities also exist both in the Council of Europe and the
OCSE. Both human rights and minority rights are given
extra weight because of the importance attached to them
by the EU in relations with applicant countries and others.
Principles of inter-state behaviour, stressing the inviolability
of national frontiers, have been enshrined in the OCSE.
They also lie at the heart of the mutual defence guarantees
of NATO and the WEU.
...and economic
Trade is the most precisely codified set of relationships
between countries in the economic sphere; specifically,
the provision for free movement of goods and services,
labour and capital within the EU and the partner countries
in the European Economic Area. Accession to the EU is
conditional upon applicant countries meeting these rules –
over three hundred linked to the operation of the single
market, for instance. But almost all European countries
(the rest soon will be) are also covered by the rules of the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), which provide an impor-
tant benchmark for the newer transition economies, as well
as setting ground rules for trade between industrial
countries.
The imminence of economic and monetary union between
some EU member states has also led to much more closely
defined rules for macroeconomic policy and coordination
right across the EU. The Maastricht criteria, in particular
limits on budget deficits and national debt, are already influ-
encing the domestic economic policies of EU members,
even those unlikely or unwilling to join EMU in the first wave.
And, of course, the IMF’s standards for monetary and
budgetary policy are influential right across central and
eastern Europe.
Less clearly codified – and much more controversial – are the
attempts both in the EU and the Council of Europe to define
a European social model – covering labour market and social
security law. This all sits uneasily with the unresolved
problem of high unemployment in many parts of Europe. But
the demands to include this area of activity in an integrating
Europe remain strong.
Last but not least are the rules of corporate governance –
minimally codified in Western Europe, but only because a
culture of relatively high business standards has developed
its own momentum over the centuries. In the transition
economies, however, issues of corporate governance 
are of increasing concern: an acceptable business 
culture does not necessarily accompany the freeing 
of markets, and in its absence, corruption and criminality
hamper economic progress. The European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has 
therefore established detailed guidelines which it 
seeks to impose as a condition of the provision of 
financial help.
Joining the right club
One obvious solution to the apparent chaos is to open
membership of all the institutions to everyone in Europe. But
this would be to go too far or too fast, riding roughshod over
the determinants of integration. So how do countries decide
which clubs they want to join? And how do those clubs
decide whom they want to admit?
History is important here: the affinity of peoples and their
willingness to share responsibility with others is linked to
their proximity, language and cultural links. This is clear from
the nature of EU enlargement over the years. Currently, the
EU applies objective economic and political criteria to its
candidates for accession. It turns out that certain states –
variously Baltic, Catholic Slav and former states of the
Austro-Hungarian empire – qualify; whereas some others –
Orthodox Slav and Muslim countries – have more difficulty.
France led its Latin neighbours in NATO to push for
Romanian membership, while the Anglo-Saxon countries
remained unpersuaded.
Economic calculations about integration start from the
issue of market openness: proximity is again an important
factor here. Monetary integration imposes more demand-
ing restrictions: economic convergence is more important,
as is assurance that new entrants are not likely to debase
the currency.
Political assessments may be influenced in the first instance
by the extent to which states share common political values.
But elites will also be sensitive to gains or losses of political
power as integration progresses – for example some large
states may ally to achieve leadership, subject to constraints
from small states which may have disproportionate voting
power. The calculation of security gains and losses is
becoming more complex in a Europe which has no obvious
external enemy, but which is concerned about political insta-
bility within the former Eastern bloc.
The process is less complicated than it first appears,
however. Core groups with shared interests and values 
have formed – the two principal ones being the EU itself,
and Russia with a group of neighbouring states. Domino
dynamics then tends to push peripheral countries to judge
that exclusion from the core is riskier than compromising
some interests by joining it. Coupled with this is a process
of disequilibrium dynamics, at least within the EU: certain
moves toward closer integration generate more momentum,
making still further steps necessary if systemic failure is to
be avoided. Thus, the single market led in turn to the drive
towards economic and monetary union, which in turn will
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In the transition economies
issues of corporate
governance are of increasing 
concern: an acceptable
business culture does not necessarily
accompany the freeing of markets, and 
in its absence, corruption and criminality
hamper economic progress.
increase the demand for democratic legitimacy at the
European level.
Mapping this process
None of this tells us what the Europe of the next century will
look like. The figure on the right is a stylised attempt to set
out three different configurations. Political Europe identifies
two core groupings: the EU and Russia, with the rest of
Europe gravitating to one or the other. But while this might
appear the most natural evolution from an historical
perspective it has serious drawbacks. First, it recreates the
divided Europe of the Cold War. And second, the Russian
bloc – the Commonwealth of Independent States – risks
being disconnected from the rules of civil society by tempt-
ing its natural leader to behave in old-style hegemonic
fashion.
Security Europe brings almost everyone together, including
North America and Central Asia, and has the advantage of
the confidence building approach of the OSCE. But as a
general mechanism for integration, it is too large; and one
key element, NATO, is again divisive. Attempts by NATO to
balance Eastern enlargement with closer cooperation with
Russia have not been wholly convincing.
Civil Europe is based on the potential membership of the
Council of Europe, and includes both Russia and Turkey. It
excludes North America and Central Asia for quite different
reasons (the US subscribes to most of the rules but
Congress would not accept European jurisdiction; Central
Asia is not seriously interested in democracy for the time
being). The idea of making this area the focus of all the rules
of a European civil society is attractive in theory. But the
mechanisms are weak in practice. Reinforcement could be
provided through an All-European Free Trade Area, with
prospects later of an All-European Single Market, along with
expanded investment in trans-European networks. Then
there could be greater empowerment of the political rules
through linkage to the economic.
Sub-federal and post-modern paradigms
The overlapping maps still beg the question – is it not time
to bring fresh order into these confusing structures? After
all, the modern state brings together a whole range of vital
functions within a single national jurisdiction; a federal state
can, similarly, have a top level jurisdiction – the US is the
pre-eminent example of the latter.
Many in the EU envisage it progressing on federal lines –
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STRATEGIC MAPS OF EUROPE, 1997
Political Europe
Civil Europe
Security Europe
The traditional nation-state
remains the focus of national
loyalties. But its role is
changing beyond recognition,
with many of its old functions devolved
upwards or downwards.
though since no-one seriously supports the idea of France
and Germany becoming like Texas and California, it might
be better to call this a sub-federal model. The aim of this
approach would be to bring together a range of powers –
money, markets, external and some internal security – under
one jurisdiction. But the role of the member state in the EU
Council would remain fundamentally different from that of a
state in the United States.
By contrast, the post-modern approach rejects the idea that
great centres of state power need be concentrated at any
one level. Instead, rules and codes are defined and enforced
at a range of national and supra-national levels, largely, at
least in theory, displacing the need for super-power states.
The post-modern state marks the obsolescence of the old
moral frontiers – between the internal control of law and
morality on the one hand and the external acceptance of
realpolitik on the other. This coincides with the increasing
obsolescence of physical frontiers in the weightless
economy. The traditional nation-state remains the focus of
national loyalties. But its role is changing beyond recognition,
with many of its old functions devolved upwards or
downwards. Its national nominees, however, are represented
at these other levels of jurisdiction, and they will behave more
like shareholders of multinational corporations. New commu-
nications technologies make it easier for these objectives to
be pursued. One can foresee the use of multi-media video-
conferencing of many a multilateral meeting, with greater
ease of switching issues onto the agenda of different institu-
tions in search of resolution.
The post-modern system offers several advantages. It
reduces the risk of monopolistic bureaucratic structures,
which are more likely to make mistakes or encourage
hegemonic tendencies. It encourages competition, albeit
restrained, among jurisdictions. It is flexible; but the opera-
tion of domino dynamics – the incentive to avoid exclusion
from the core – still prevents undue fragmentation.
Widening and deepening...
All this prompts a fresh look at the twin concepts of widen-
ing and deepening in Europe. The EU and NATO have
already embarked on a process of widening; but not without
causing uncertainty and friction. The EU’s new single
currency marks a deepening of the links between the partic-
ipating member states; but its advent will in turn create other
profound issues which will need to be addressed. The
widest manifestations of Europe exist in the Council of
Europe and the OCSE: but they are shallow and weak
organisations.
Yet the two biggest economic and security issues facing
Europe today are all about the shallowness of the widest
Europe. They are first, whether the transition economies can
get onto a durable fast track towards economic prosperity,
and second, whether they can achieve political stability.
Both these issues would be best addressed by ensuring the
extension of the eight sets of rules for civil society right
across Europe.
The most plausible routes for achieving this may be by widen-
ing the deep European map – the EU; and by deepening the
wide map – the Council of Europe. Over time, therefore,
these two maps would move closer together – prompting the
question of whether the one might merge into the other at
some point in the first part of the twenty first century. It is
possible: although this might strike some as a rather tame
evolutionary approach for a radically new situation.
...or tabula rasa?
Perhaps a more radical approach would be justified. What
would happen if one were to look at a tabula rasa, forgetting
all the present institutions accumulated as a jumble, each
the product of a specific political moment, with no real
attempt to maintain systemic coherence? The tabula rasa
approach would probably assign all eight sets of rules,
wholly or in part, to the all-European level, ie European Civil
Society should be the ‘basic’ Europe. 
Only two functions would need to remain restricted to a core
group of countries which would need to be highly conver-
gent in all relevant respects – monetary union, and defence
union; although this would not exclude rules relating to
monetary and defence cooperation having a wider European
application. This core group would then justify the name
European Federal Union.
Of course, this would turn Europe upside down, or inside
out. It would be far too clear-cut. But as Europe, as seems
more likely, proceeds with its hesitant widenings, and flexi-
ble deepenings in a messier way, those involved should bear
in mind that the underlying market pressures – in both polit-
ical and economic markets – are pushing for a tabula rasa.
Only this explains what is really going on.
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The two biggest economic 
and security issues facing
Europe today are all about the
shallowness of the widest
Europe. They are first, whether the transition
economies can get onto a durable fast track
towards economic prosperity, and second,
whether they can achieve political stability.
Michael Emerson is a senior research fellow at the CEP, 
and former EU Ambassador to Moscow.
T
here are of course enormous benefits to be had
from greater European economic integration, and
clear gains from projects like the European single
market. Ultimately, complete economic integration in
Europe will benefit from a single European currency, just as
there would be benefits from a single European language, or
a single European driving licence. The gains from a single
currency are of course very much less than those from a
single language: indeed, technical progress is already
forcing down the costs of maintaining separate national
currencies to minimal levels – credit cards, for example can
be used without regard to national currencies. While these
costs may be small and getting smaller, in an ideal world
they need not exist at all. 
Yes – but when?
But accepting that a single European currency is in some
respects desirable in principle, or indeed at some stage
inevitable in practice, is not to say that it should happen
now. The movement towards economic integration has not
meant doing everything together and instantaneously. The
vital tactical questions are of speed and sequencing. A
single currency removes a vital dimension of national
economic policy at a stage when in many other respects the
nation states of Europe retain distinct economic identities.
It is the locking together of one element of the economy
while others remain free to move independently that can
lead to problems.
A single currency is of course much more than a technical
advance in the operation of a single market. It involves the
renunciation by the nation state of autonomy in a fundamen-
tal area of economic policy, namely the control of the
nation’s money, and the transfer of responsibility for
monetary policy from the nation state to a European institu-
tion. Historically, a national money has been a defining
feature of a nation state, and control over monetary matters
a key responsibility of a national government. It is interest-
ing now to look back on the American debate after indepen-
dence as to whether there should be a national currency in
America or whether each state should issue its own money.
The ‘Federalists’ (Hamilton) triumphed over the advocates
of States’ Rights (Jefferson), and few would dispute that
the position of the Federal government was greatly
strengthened as a result. A single currency in Europe could
likewise be expected to strengthen the powers of European
institutions relative to national governments. This is there-
fore as much a ‘constitutional’ as an economic issue, and 
a question where progress should depend on the 
support of the people, as well as of political leaders, in the
countries concerned.
Why not ask the people?
Despite the importance of the constitutional questions
involved, the Maastricht Treaty made no provision for
consulting the people. The absence of any democratic crite-
ria for accession to the single currency stands in sharp
contrast to the very precise specification of the financial
criteria. This seems a bad start: constitutional changes
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Emu:
convergence 
or divergence?
Economic and monetary union – the European single currency – is 
due to start in January 1999 for the first wave of countries able 
and wanting to join. Richard Jackman of the CEP questions whether
the current plan is the best way of achieving greater economic
integration in Europe.
surely require the support of electorates, not just of govern-
ments (a point explicitly recognised by the ‘triple hurdle’
commitment of the new UK government, which makes
accession to the single currency dependent on the support
of the Cabinet, Parliament and the people in a referendum). 
If one were to set up a consensual procedure for moving to
a monetary union, the first step would surely be to ensure
that it has the support of the people in all the countries
concerned. Only then should the union go ahead. A union is
by definition a collective decision; it cannot exist if some
countries opt out. The Maastricht proposals are however not
for consensual monetary union, but rather for a greater
deutschemark zone, which other countries can join if they
are willing to sign up to the monetary policies and practices
of the Bundesbank. These are the issues identified at
Maastricht: in particular, stable prices, fiscal responsibility
and central bank independence. 
In or out?
It’s thus striking, though perhaps not surprising, that among
the bigger European countries, enthusiasm for EMU tends
to be inversely related to the perceived competence of the
national government in monetary management, with the
Italians the greatest enthusiasts. Equally unsurprisingly, the
countries keenest to join are those least likely to be allowed
in. Membership of EMU thus offers low inflation and finan-
cial stability to countries which can prove they have these
things already. 
One reason why there is not greater enthusiasm for the
single currency, particularly amongst the growing ranks of
Europe’s unemployed, is that these preconditions have
imposed excessively deflationary policies on the aspiring
member states. The Maastricht convergence criteria require
not only fixed exchange rates, thus imposing the
Bundesbank’s restrictive monetary policies across Europe,
but also the now famous 3% limit on budget deficits, which
has ensured that in most countries fiscal deflation accom-
panies monetary. The depressed economic conditions have
reduced tax revenues and thus further increased fiscal
deficits; this in turn has required further cuts in government
spending (or tax increases) to meet the 3% deficit ceiling.
As a result, millions of people have been thrown out of work
in Europe for no good reason, with only countries like the
UK and Denmark, which have negotiated the right to opt out
of the single currency and have therefore been able to run
their economies in the light of domestic economic condi-
tions, escaping the general malaise. 
Ironically, the recoveries now forecast for France and
Germany are being driven by the sharp falls in the franc and
deutschemark exchange rates relative to the US dollar and
pound sterling – the very flexibility which a fixed exchange
rate system would remove.
This rather depressing start of the process towards the
single currency has in fact served to highlight its most
serious drawback. Under EMU, monetary policy cannot be
set separately in each country with regard to its economic
circumstances, but rather must be set uniformly for all
member countries irrespective of their individual needs.
Some economists argue that independent national monetary
policies are unnecessary because wages and prices are
flexible and can achieve the same effect. But recent
evidence does not support this view.
The ERM experience 
It is remarkable that those economies whose currencies fell
within, or were pushed out of, the Exchange Rate
Mechanism in 1992 have enjoyed not only more rapid growth
but also a continuing decline in inflation (see table overleaf).
The currency crises of autumn 1992 and 1993 led to five
other countries either leaving the ERM (the United Kingdom
and Italy), or devaluing (Spain and Portugal) or breaking their
link with the mechanism (Sweden). These countries suffered
falls in their exchange rates averaging over 30%. 
By contrast, the five countries remaining within the ERM or
who maintained the parity of their currency with the
deutschemark (Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands
and Switzerland) were rewarded with a significantly slower
growth rate and a smaller decline in inflation than the
countries which left the ERM.
9
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Research at the CEP attempting to explain these develop-
ments* suggests that the traditional (‘Phillips Curve’) theory
that high unemployment leads to falling inflation is still valid,
but that once inflation rates have fallen to very low levels,
even very high unemployment will not cause inflation to fall
any further. In other words, at very low rates of inflation the
Phillips Curve becomes flat. So if an economy is in deep
recession, one cannot rely on falling wages and prices to
lead the economy back to full employment. What is 
needed is an increase in demand, and this of course implies
that the government must be free to set its own monetary
(and fiscal) policy. 
The franc fort and Swedish monetarism
The clearest case has been the French economy. In 
1983, France adopted the franc fort policy, which involved
fixing the value of the exchange rate within the European
Monetary system, and giving exchange rate stabilisation
priority over domestic policy objectives. As a result, infla-
tion in France fell sharply (from 9.5% in 1983 to 2.5% in
1986) and unemployment rose from 8% to 10%. But, over
the ten years since 1986, inflation has remained low while
unemployment has continued to rise. Persistently 
high unemployment has not brought further falls in inflation
(it seems to have bottomed out at around 1.5%); yet 
low inflation has not of itself led to a resurgence of
demand. The French economy had to wait for the
weakness of the deutschemark in 1997 to enable it to
begin to recover its competitiveness.
Matters have been made worse in France because the
economic unpopularity of the persistent unemployment
caused by the franc fort policy has made it more difficult for
the government to introduce unpopular reforms in other
areas, in particular in the labour market. France thus
remains one of the most heavily regulated, and heavily taxed,
labour markets in Europe; and, as the election victory of the
new Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin demonstrates,
looks set to stay that way.
More dramatically, in 1990 Sweden abandoned its tradi-
tional commitment to full employment in favour of monetary
orthodoxy. The policy has been very successful in reducing
the Swedish inflation rate, which actually became negative
at the end of 1996, but the unemployment rate shot up from
less than 2% in 1990 to 9.5% by 1993, and, despite
massive training and job creation programmes for the
unemployed, shows no sign of a decline. 
Economists often argue that a fully anticipated inflation rate
of 1% is no different from a fully anticipated inflation rate of
5% or 7% once everyone has adjusted to it, and there is
thus no reason why countries should not speedily adjust to
any monetary regime. 
But the evidence appears more consistent with the view that
there is a limit to how low inflation can be pushed in any
economy without having real economic effects. Some
economies appear able to function effectively even with an
inflation rate of less than 1% – essentially with stable prices
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Change in effective exchange rates, and growth rates of real GDP, and GDP deflator, 1992-96
Five appreciating countries and five depreciating countries
Appreciating Depreciating Difference between 
countries countries depreciating 
and appreciating
Effective nominal exchange rate
1992: Q2 99.5 99.1 -0.4
1996: Q2 102.9 86.3 -16.6
1996-1992 3.4 -12.8 -16.2
Per cent change in real GDP
1992: Q2 1.7 0.2 -1.5
1996: Q2 1.4 1.8 0.4
1996-1992 -0.3 1.6 1.9
Per cent change in GDP deflator
1992: Q2 2.5 4.8 2.3
1996: Q2 1.8 3.1 1.3
1996-1992 -0.7 -1.7 -1.0
Notes: Appreciating countries are Austria, Belgium, France, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. Depreciating countries are Italy,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. All data are
aggregated using 1985 Summers-Heston GDP weights.
Source: 1992 figures: Macroeconomic Policies and Structural Reform,
OECD Proceedings, 1996. 1996 figures: GDP and GDP deflator growth
rates are from IMF World Economic Outlook, October 1996, tables A2
and A9. Effective nominal exchange rate index from IMF International
Financial Statistics, 1997.
The Maastricht proposals are not for consensual monetary union, but rather for a
greater deutschemark zone, which other countries can join if they are willing to sign
up to the monetary policies and practices of the Bundesbank.
* R. Jackman ‘EU labour markets inside and outside the
Monetary Union’ paper prepared for Conference on European
Monetary Union: Transition, International Aspects and Policy Options’,
Potsdam, April, 1996. 
– but others may function better with inflation in the range
2–3%, or even 4–5%. Low but positive rates of inflation
facilitate the adjustment of relative prices and wages,
provide a low but useful tax on wealth, and erode the
burdens of past debt on current enterprise. Of course, infla-
tion also has costs, and in advanced economies with sophis-
ticated financial systems these surely overwhelm the
benefits long before inflation gets into double digits.
Nevertheless, where there are financial and institutional
rigidities the optimal rate of inflation is not necessarily zero,
nor necessarily the same for all countries.
The experiences of France and Sweden suggest that where
a government forces upon an economy too severe a
monetary regime, inflation can indeed be held down, but
only at the expense of long periods of high unemployment.
In the UK, it could be argued – and, indeed, has been by
many – that the restrictive monetarist policies introduced by
the Thatcher government in 1979 led to at least a decade of
mass unemployment.
Of course, it could also be argued that long periods of high
unemployment are the only way of achieving lower inflation
and if governments think that a price worth paying, there is
no more to be said. EMU is then simply providing a pretext
for painful policies which are recognised to be necessary
anyway. But the evidence suggests that monetary ortho-
doxy can always and easily bring down inflation, the
problem is to avoid the after-effect of persistent mass
unemployment. And in this respect, a monetary straitjacket,
be it internally or externally imposed, can prevent the
adoption of appropriate demand management policies to
support an economic recovery.
Worse to come?
But a prolonged period of high unemployment may not
simply be the entry price for joining EMU. Unfortunately,
there are risks ahead in addition to the problems immedi-
ately apparent. One is the possibility of wage emulation: that
within a single currency area workers will compare their
wages to those of workers doing similar jobs in other
countries, and seek to match them. Productivity differences
between such groups will then lead to permanent structural
unemployment, akin to the regional unemployment problems
which characterise a number of European economies.
Second, there is the likelihood that the European Central
Bank (ECB) will adopt monetary targets which, given the
uncertainty over the demand for the new Euro, could turn
out to be excessively contractionary. And third, a single
currency reduces the capacity of individual economies to
adjust to shocks. 
There are basically only two ways in which an economy can
adjust to external shocks. One is through changes in its
prices relative to other countries, either through changes in
the exchange rate or through variations in money wages. 
In the case of a single currency, the former is, of course,
ruled out;  the latter made very difficult by the low inflation
regime likely to be imposed by the ECB. The second is
through changes in quantities, that is to say by the
movement of labour from depressed to prosperous areas. In
this latter respect Europe is most unlike that great example
of a successful single currency area, the United States of
America. In Europe, there is little mobility of labour within,
and virtually no mobility between, countries. An expansion-
ary shock, such as the current building society windfalls in
the UK, can with independent monetary policy be offset by
temporarily higher interest rates and a consequential tempo-
rary appreciation of the exchange rate. With a single
currency, excess demand would push up wages and prices,
but once the expansionary effects of the shock fade away
wages and prices would not fall back, because they are less
flexible than the exchange rate, but rather would remain at
an uncompetitive level. 
Costs versus benefits
The employment costs of EMU could thus be very substan-
tial indeed; while the benefits, principally reduced transac-
tions costs, are clearly minimal. Why then should any
country, other than one with a hopelessly irresponsible or
incompetent national government, wish to join? In the
1980s, there was a fear that the European ideal would
collapse unless there were major new European initiatives.
The single currency was conceived as the next step follow-
ing the completion of the single market project in 1992. But
the disintegration of the ERM in 1992 and 1993 suggests
that this sequence was perhaps misjudged, and that a
greater degree of institutional harmonisation would need to
precede the successful adoption of a single currency. And
the collapse of communism at the end of the 1980s means
that the EU has very much more important issues, such as
the accession of the countries of Eastern Europe, to
concern itself with. 
But as problems with the single currency have mounted, the
political commitment of those associated with the proposal
from the beginning has become stronger. The more EMU
becomes an article of faith, rather than a matter of economic
reasoning, the greater the sacrifices that it may be deemed
to justify. The more pragmatic approach to economic policy
currently adopted in the UK and in the Scandinavian
countries may emphasise the policy differences with those
countries aiming to join the single currency at the start. The
attempt to achieve greater union in Europe could then lead
instead to political division.
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Richard Jackman is Executive Director of the Human 
Resources Programme at the CEP, and Cassel Reader 
in Economics at the LSE.
Accepting that a single European currency is in some respects desirable in principle, or indeed 
at some stage inevitable in practice, is not to say that it should happen now. The movement
towards economic integration has not meant doing everything together and instantaneously.
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Recipe
With the single currency deadline approaching fast,
the European Union’s regional policy is seen by
many outside as less significant and less
contentious. But as the CEP’s Diego Puga
explains, reform of this key
area of European policy
is an essential
prerequisite of the
ambitious enlargement
programme about to
get under way.
for reform: 
regional policy for 
an enlarging 
European Union
E
conomic and monetary union may be grabbing the
headlines at present, but it is increasingly clear that
the plans for enlarging the European Union will 
have at least as great an impact on its future 
development. The European Commission has now
recommended that accession
negotiations start in 1998 with five of
the ten countries that have applied for EU
membership: Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the
Czech Republic and Slovenia. Negotiations will
also start next year with Cyprus whose applica-
tion was viewed favourably by the Commission
in 1993. Such negotiations, and the prospect
of twenty plus members of the EU within the
next few years, will present a huge challenge
for the EU’s regional policy at a time when it
faces greater pressures than ever before from
within the existing Union.
Until recently, regional policy had accounted for
only a small proportion of the EU budget. But,
with growing concern about reducing
regional disparities, the Structural Funds
(the main instrument of regional policy) are
the fastest-growing component of the EU Budget.
These funds have been allocated 200 billion ecus (at
1997 prices) for the period 1994–1999 – thus accounting
for one third of total EU spending, double the proportion for
1988, and about 0.4% of total EU GNP. The current
arrangements for the Structural Funds expire in 1999: at
that point they will need to be reformed in order to provide
an effective regional policy for the EU until at least 2006.
The scale of the challenge
It is difficult to exaggerate the problems posed for regional
policy by the applicant countries. Those with whom negotia-
tions are likely to begin next year have a GDP per capita
which is only 30% of the EU average, measured at purchas-
ing power parity. By contrast, the GDP per capita of
Greece, the poorest member of the current union, is 63% of
the EU average. (See table overleaf.)
The resource transfer implications are huge. At present,
more than two thirds of all Structural Funds money goes to
promote the ‘development and structural adjustment of
regions whose development is lagging behind’; these are
known as Objective One Regions. Providing Objective One
money for the applicant countries would cost 25 billion ecus
a year – compared with the 19 billion ecus earmarked for
1999 for all Objective One regions in the EU.
The European Commission, in its Agenda 2000 has already
recommended that, to avoid placing intolerable strain on the
EU Budget, total spending on regional policies will remain
pegged at 0.46% of EU GNP beyond 1999; that includes
the Structural Funds and also the Cohesion Fund, which
covers countries with less than 90% of the average EU
GNP per person – at present
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and
Greece. At the same time,
funds for any one country would be
limited to 4% of its GDP. These limits would also ease
potentially serious absorption problems, since recipient
countries must themselves meet some of the cost of
projects financed by the Structural Funds. On this basis, it
is expected that the Structural Funds and the Cohesion
Fund will together be allocated around 275 billion ecus in
the 6 years from 2000. 45 billion ecus of that will go to the
applicant countries, 7 billion of which could be provided
before they actually join.
But deciding the allocation for the Funds is only the first step.
The main unresolved question is how to adapt the EU’s
regional policy instruments for the future in view of the
challenge of enlargement. It is particularly important to try to
coordinate assistance for the applicant countries with other
elements of the pre-accession strategy to ensure that they
catch up rapidly with the living standards of current members.
The challenge from within
Prospective enlargement highlights the gap between EU
member states and the applicant countries. But the EU’s
regional policy must also address the profound regional
income disparities within the Union. One quarter of the
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Prospective enlargement highlights the gap between EU member states 
and the applicant countries. But the EU’s regional policy must also address
the profound regional income disparities within the Union.
by Diego Puga
European Union’s citizens live in ‘Objective One’ regions,
where GDP per capita is less than three quarters of the EU
average. If a similar measure were used for the United
States, only two states, Mississippi and West Virginia,
containing between them only 2% of the population of the
US, would qualify.
Over the past fifteen years income differences across
member states have fallen, but inequalities between regions
within each member state have risen (see chart).
At the same time, regional problems have, in
spatial terms, become less clearly identified as
large disadvantaged regions and more as
concentrated pockets of poverty and unemploy-
ment; this is particularly true in central and northern member
states. Over the same period, there has been an intense
process of regional specialisation in different sectors in the
EU. The picture is further complicated by the persistent
failure of some regions to catch up in spite of continuing
resource transfers. All these issues need to be addressed.
The European Commission has already made a start, by
announcing changes to simplify the operation of the
Structural Funds; instead of seven different objectives, there
will be only three. But presentational changes could also
have an important role in improving public awareness of
regional policy. Instead of assigning each objecting a
number – meaningless to outsiders – the Funds could be
given titles which explain their function – such as regional
development, social and economic adaptation, and human
resource formation.
Spending the money effectively
As with the funds for applicant countries, a key question is
which projects will be financed under these different objec-
tives. To choose appropriately between projects it is impor-
tant to understand their full impact on regional inequalities.
Take infrastructure provision. What are the effects of a road
project connecting regions with different levels of industrial-
isation? Some growth economists would regard infrastruc-
ture as merely another input into production and the road
project as an addition to the infrastructure stock of affected
regions which would help them grow. But this approach
excludes the role of transport infrastructure in facilitating the
movement of goods and people across space.
A cost-benefit analyst would go into the fine detail
of the project, but would probably not go very
far in quantifying its impact. Traditional cost-
benefit analysis would look at the direct
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Improvements in transport infrastructure also make it easier for firms 
in richer regions to supply poorer regions at a distance, and can thus harm
the industrialisation prospects of less developed areas.
GDP per person at purchasing Population
power parity in 1993 in 1995
(EU=100) (millions)
Current EU Member States 100 371
Luxembourg 160 0.4
Belgium 115 10
Denmark 113 5
Austria 112 8
France 109 58
Germany 108 82
Netherlands 104 15
Italy 103 57
United Kingdom 99 59
Sweden 98 9
Finland 90 5
Ireland 82 4
Spain 77 39
Portugal 68 10
Greece 63 10
Applicants with favourable opinion 
from EU Commission 30 61
Cyprus 63* 0.7
Slovenia 54 2
Czech Republic 49 10
Hungary 35 10
Poland 27 39
Estonia 22 1
Applicants without favourable opinion 
from EU Commission 21 43
Slovak Republic 34 5
Bulgaria 25 8
Romania 21 23
Lithuania 21 4
Latvia 18 3
Sources: Eurostat and World Bank. 
* For Cyprus, GNP per person in 1987.
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Source: Joan Maria Esteban based on Theil’s index of regional
inequality for the EU, 1980–89.
impact of the project through reductions in
transport costs, and also at its induced
effect through changes in the number of
journeys undertaken. But
that is enough only if two
conditions are met: that
distortions and market
failures are not significant;
and that only those
activities closely
related to the project
are much affected by it. However,
there has been an increasing realisation throughout
economics that wide ranges of economic activities
may be affected by market failure and distortions; and
spatial spillovers, both positive and negative, can amplify
rather than dampen the effects of a project as they spread
through the economy. 
On the positive side, for instance, better communications
can make a less developed region a more attractive location
for firms by providing improved access to the inputs and
markets of more developed regions. A rise in the level of
activity of one industry in that region can in turn induce
another supplying industry to produce at a more efficient
scale, and so on. Cumulative causation can provide the road
project with positive effects for less favoured regions, wider
and stronger than its direct impact. Similarly, on the negative
side, improvements in transport infrastructure also make it
easier for firms in richer regions to supply poorer regions at
a distance, and can thus harm the industrialisation
prospects of less developed areas.
It is therefore important to complement traditional cost-
benefit analysis with a quantification of these wider effects
to assess accurately the impact of projects. Recently devel-
oped location theories provide the tools – at the CEP,
Anthony Venables and Michael Gasiorek have already used
them to assess the impact of several projects financed by
the Cohesion Fund. Such theories suggest that the overall
impact of a project depends not only on the nature of the
project itself but also on the economic environment. For
instance, the combination of minimal inter-regional migration
with wage setting at the national sectoral level has arguably
led infrastructure improvements to worsen the convergence
prospects of the Italian Mezzogiorno. Lacking the industrial
base and market size of northern Italian regions, but having
similar factor costs, local firms there have lost to northern
competitors as better communications have lowered the
natural protection they enjoyed.
Gains from enlargement
The interaction between regional spending and economic
environment also underlines the importance of coordinating 
the Structural Funds with other aspects of the 
pre-accession strategy for Central and Eastern European
countries. The applicants lack the industrial base and expen-
diture levels of richer EU member states. Yet in many cases
their geographical proximity to central EU markets, along with
their comparatively low costs and skilled labour force, help to
compensate for their disadvantages and have allowed them
to attract large inward investment flows. Over the next few
years more firms can be expected to settle in the Central and
Eastern European countries, creating positive externalities
that will attract further investments; and the applicants will
see their incomes rise towards the levels of existing EU
members as new opportunities for firms and consumers
bring benefits to both East and West. In the April 1997 issue
of Economic Policy, Richard Baldwin, Joseph Francois and
Richard Portes estimate such gains to be large for the appli-
cants, and small but unevenly distributed for current member
states – Germany alone would get about one third of the total
gain, and France and the UK would together get about
another third. This, of course, has important budgetary impli-
cations.  Given that it will gain most from enlargement,
Germany will find it hard to convince its partners to accept a
reduction in its contribution to the EU budget, as recently
demanded by senior German politicians. The economic
costs and benefits of EU membership cannot be narrowed to
the difference between each country’s contribution to, and
receipts from, the EU budget. And, particularly with
Eastwards enlargement, even the full economic gains are
likely to be dwarfed by the political benefits of a more stable
and democratic Europe. 
But caution is needed
Two risks could undermine this ideal scenario. An enlarge-
ment which involved too large a gap in wage levels between
new and existing members could drain the newcomers of
their more skilled workers if full labour mobility across the
larger union were introduced straightaway. But while it might
therefore be tempting to try to force applicant country wage
levels close to those of the EU as rapidly as possible, such a
process should not be rushed. German reunification
provides a clear example of how integration can homogenise
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Given that it will gain most from enlargement, Germany will find it hard to convince its partners to accept
a reduction in its contribution to the EU budget, as recently demanded by senior German politicians. 
wages across regions offering very different degrees of
attraction to firms. Between the first quarter of 1990 and
October of the same year wages in the former 
Eastern Germany rose by 42%. Half that increase was
accounted for by the harmonisation of social security
contributions alone.
While EU membership must ultimately involve the same
status for entrants as for existing members, different aspects
of membership will need to be phased in at different speeds.
A long transition period before full labour mobility would be
preferable to unjustified wage increases in the new entrants
– resulting either from the harmonisation of labour market
regulations or from other reasons – which would push the
objective of a more cohesive Union further away.
Who knows best?
For current member states, regional inequalities are increas-
ingly within rather than across countries. This has led the
European Commission to propose decentralising the admin-
istration of Structural Funds to local governments, on the
basis that they have better information on local needs and the
costs of addressing them. On the face of it, this argument
makes sense, but regional governments are unlikely to
assess accurately and then internalise pecuniary externalities
created by local activities which have effects beyond regional
political boundaries. The optimal degree of decentralisation
therefore is a compromise: between exploiting better infor-
mation on local conditions by delegating the decision to a
small local jurisdiction; and taking proper account of broader
repercussions by delegating powers to a larger jurisdiction.
The issue of decentralisation is also affected by location
theories which suggest that the spatial distribution of
economic activities is just one of many possible equilibrium
configurations. The progress towards any one outcome is
punctuated by critical points at which just a small difference
can determine which region gets which industrial sector. This
could justify subsidising activity; it also highlights one of the
main dangers of such subsidy.
Attaining a critical mass of industrial activity in a less devel-
oped region can enable it to take off. Subsidies are one
possible device by which industrial production can be devel-
oped to that level. But subsidies do not come without
dangers, which go beyond possible production inefficien-
cies. While specialisation implies that not all regions will – or
should – have production in the same sectors, subsidies
give regional governments incentives to compete for sectors
which they regard as particularly attractive, regardless of
their wider economic desirability. 
All of this suggests that funds that can be used to attract
particular investments should be administered centrally and
subject to clear rules. Otherwise we are likely to see firms
shopping for aid while regional governments compete for
activities they consider particularly important. That would not
only be inefficient, it would undermine the credibility of
European regional policy.
State aid matters too
But controlling the use of European regional funds is not
sufficient. Subsidies offered to firms usually adopt the form
of aid from individual member states. State aid to enter-
prises in the EU amounted to 2% of Community GDP
annually between 1988 and 1990. That represents 4.3% of
total government expenditure, more than the revenue gener-
ated from direct taxation of enterprises. Uncontrolled
competition between regions to influence firms’ choice of
location can bid up levels of regional aid as public authori-
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Uncontrolled competition between regions to influence firms’ choice of location 
can bid up levels of regional aid as public authorities come under pressure to 
match or surpass the aid level available in other regions. 
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ties come under pressure to match or surpass the aid level
available in other regions. In such a contest the more
prosperous member states can take advantage of their
deeper pockets to outbid less prosperous ones. The EU has
set differential ceilings on state aid; in practice, though, the
less prosperous states face more restrictive budgetary
constraints of their own. State aid levels tend, therefore, to
be roughly proportional to GDP levels. Unless tighter
ceilings are introduced for wealthier states, a tool justified as
a means of helping less developed regions escape from
underdevelopment traps could end up by trapping them all
the more firmly.
Adapting to industrial change
Further European integration is likely to intensify
the process of regional specialisation in
the EU, as firms move closer
to other firms in related activities in order to exploit positive
externalities; and move away from firms in unrelated activi-
ties to avoid having to compete with them for immobile
factors and non-tradeable goods and services. But even if
specialisation yields large gains overall, workers employed
by locally declining sectors will suffer as regions adapt.
Given the low propensity of European workers to migrate,
adjustment will have to take place mainly through the
movement of workers between sectors within each region
rather than through the movement of workers between
regions within each sector. The EU already finances
programmes that help workers adapt to industrial change,
but such programmes are still relatively small. Greater
regional specialisation will increase the need for schemes
designed to enable workers to move from locally declining
to locally expanding sectors. It will also increase the general
need for funding for regions in difficulties because of the
nature of their sectoral specialisation, under what is
currently known as Objective Two of the Structural Funds.
Sharing the risk
While the owners of factors employed by locally declining
sectors will be adversely hit by industrial specialisation,
owners of factors employed by locally expanding sectors will
benefit. However, the latter will also be exposed to increas-
ing risk. In a more specialised Europe, sector-specific
shocks will become increasingly region-specific shocks.
Human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot easily be
diversified. Regional policy could provide insurance to
workers by establishing contingent transfers from the
relatively fortunate to the relatively unfortunate.
However, unlike the US, the EU has no automatic mecha-
nism for shifting resources across regions in the face of
asymmetric shocks. When a region’s income falls in the US,
40% of the fall is absorbed by the federal government (34%
through lower taxes going out of a region, the rest from
larger transfers coming in); in Europe only 0.5% of a fall in
a country’s income is absorbed by the rest of the Union. The
small size of the EU budget means that national govern-
ments are better placed to provide insurance against transi-
tory shocks for individual regions than EU regional policy.
But if the fiscal constraints attached to the formation of EMU
are too tough, it may be increasingly difficult even for
national governments to do that job.
This is yet another illustration of the extent to which the twin
challenges facing the EU in the run-up to the millennium are
inextricably interlinked. Regional policy has a vital part to
play in the preparations and implementation of the most
radical enlargement the EU has yet faced. Its role in the
process of economic integration within the existing Union is
no less crucial.
Diego Puga is a Research Officer at the CEP and a consultant to
the European Commission.
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Putting Britain First by Austin Mitchell
B
ritish Euro-enthusiasts dream
that Tony Blair will interpose
himself between France and
Germany to lead Europe in a
new direction, carefully left undefined.
Sadly, as long as monetary union is
the only game in the European Union
(EU) this dream is blocked as effec-
tively as everything else. However
great its goodwill, Labour can’t play it
without breaking undertakings and
party unity. Why should we, when the
determination of the EU elite to press
on, against both economic sense and
the wishes of the people, ensures four
years of floundering disarray? New
Labour is about success, not failure,
and a British government compelled to
grapple with the domestic conse-
quences of Europe’s folly can’t lead
the EU out of its DIY mess.
Monetary union is a political process
of Europe-building, mis-sold as bring-
ing economic benefits. It builds union
from the top down without popular
consent, but using the currency as a
political instrument distorts its
economic role of insulating the
domestic economy. Floating curren-
cies allow shocks to be taken on the
exchange rate and so clear the market
by letting the rate change with the
circumstances. If all this is ruled out,
damage to the weaker economies
(including Britain) is the inevitable
result, though this is currently
obscured by the immediate agonies
resulting from the monetarist conver-
gence criteria. The deflation and cuts
necessary to get down to an arbitrary
3% budget deficit have turned Europe
into a low growth, high unemployment
blackspot and trapped its economies
in self-reinforcing deflation. As
demand is cut, unemployment rises,
tax receipts decline, so spending and
deficits grow. Q.E.D.
The consequences for Britain are like
those for neighbouring tribes when
New Guinea natives abandoned culti-
vation to pursue cargo cults. The most
damaging is the effect on our
exchange rate as speculative flows
flee the uncertainty of other European
currencies for our high interest rates,
forcing up the pound. This will lead
to yet another industrial blood-letting
next year. It was a mistake to give the
Bank of England control over interest
rates at any time. To do it when
Europe’s folly pushes up the pound is
disastrous.
Speculative pressures are currently on
us and will remain strong. Yet as union
approaches they spread across the
Channel. Maintaining existing parities,
followed by a three-year lock on
currency relationships from 1999 to
the Euro in 2002, recreates the
scenario which gave speculators so
much fun and profit under the old
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).
Requiring central banks to reward
speculators by buying back currency
at official rates guarantees years of
turmoil as economic realities and fixed
rates diverge.
Monetary union is a collective leap
from the Eiffel Tower, promising not
only to design the parachute on the
way down, but also to get agreement
on whether the landing should be hard
or soft. Germany wants a hard Euro.
Yet the deutschemark has been falling.
With domestic deflation this is the only
escape route for German industry, so
it could become addictive. Also the
ultimate decision on admissions is
political. With Germany itself in danger
failing to meet the criteria it cannot
preach strict compliance to France,
Italy or even Spain. If they are in, the
Euro is soft.
New Labour’s strategy is not Euro-
leadership but better Euro-PR, talk the
language of Maastricht and hang loose
until the next election. Yet EMU’s
impact on our exchange rates makes
that difficult. The pound is up 24%
against the deutschemark and the
franc. Britain’s balance of payments
with Europe will gape. Manufacturing
will shrink and shed jobs (again).
Foreign investment (as distinct from
funny money) will seek more profitable
and competitive bases elsewhere. So
unless the pound comes down and we
manage the rate for competitiveness,
major difficulties lie ahead for the self-
trussed British turkey. With a soft Euro
they become more acute and are
indefinitely prolonged.
Europe’s obsession with the single
currency, and ours with
‘Bankernomics’, make for a gloomy
scenario. The speculators who saved
us from the ERM are now working the
other way while Europe will probably
POLITICS SPECIAL:
Britain and Europe
continued on p32
It’s five years since Black Wednesday when the pound was forced
out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, an event which had a
profound impact on political debate about Britain and Europe. 
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Europe: Five years on by Edwina Currie
H
ad the question of Britain’s
role in Europe been put at
any time before the May
1997 general election the
answer would have been clear. Britain
did not appear to have – or want –
much of a role. Other than carping,
criticising, and blaming ‘Europe’ for
self-inflicted wounds, the then UK
government seemed neither to 
understand the workings of the
modern European Union, nor how to
make it function in the interests of its
own people.
That ignorance and confusion was
reflected in voters’ opinions. To the
alarm of pro-European activists in the
European Movement, confusion and
argument over Black Wednesday, the
Maastricht Treaty and the single
European currency saw support for
British membership of the EU begin to
fall away, until, in one poll, only one
third of voters were in favour; one third
were against, with one third throwing
up their hands in despair as ‘don’t
knows’. But the main plea was for
more information. The active hostility of
the Tory fringe was rare.
Black Wednesday was not, in
retrospect, quite the economic
disaster it first appeared – but nor was
it the successful economic revolution
claimed by Norman Lamont and
others. A floating exchange rate was
not the sole reason for Britain’s
recovery in the period since then:
flexible labour markets and the hefty
inward investment of the late eighties
were also significant, highlighting the
contrast with the continuing recession
in continental Europe.
Attitudes remain confused, though
marginally less xenophobic, under the
Blair administration. To my
disappointment, we will not yet be
swapping sterling for the Euro:
membership in the first wave has been
ruled out. George Soros can sleep
soundly in his bed: the see-sawing
foreign exchanges in London will keep
him in lucrative business for some
years yet.
The Maastricht criteria which are
causing so much grief elsewhere do
not seem to be having the same effect
here. Blair and his Chancellor, Gordon
Brown, have adopted sound money
principles as if born to them. An
independent central bank is already a
reality. The electorate in Britain, having
contemplated the delights of higher
taxation, have opted instead for tight
control of public spending. Maybe
there is a lesson here for politicians in
other countries?
Yet, by contrast, the Social Chapter of
the Maastricht Treaty is about to
become UK law. A future Chancellor
will also have to explain to irate
inquirers how families are expected to
benefit as the minimum wage, to be
introduced next year, makes their low
paid jobs illegal. The answer, of
course, is that the black economy is
alive and well throughout Europe.
Berlin is being re-built by non-German
workers, willing to defy both the  EU
Working Time Directive and laws on
social security. The main gainers from
the Social Chapter are those who
laugh and ignore it.
It’s in this area that Britain has an
important role in European integration,
if only the over-cautious ninnies in
Whitehall could see it. We can
demonstrate to our partners how
sustained economic growth is
achieved. Free trade, privatisation and
an end to government subsidies for
business have served us well, as New
Labour willingly acknowledges.
Cheap and flexible labour forces can
compete effectively with rivals in
Japan, America and the tiger
economies. Keeping their products
(like Japanese-made cars) out of our
markets artificially is not the wisest
response.
Big shifts of policy are needed by all
Europe’s governments. Courage mes
braves! Enlargement of the European
Union poses dramatic problems and
worries, not least over the potential
for huge – and unpopular – transfer
payments to the would-be new
members. Yet with flexibility, these
countries could compete. We 
should bite the bullet of the most
antiquated budget of all, the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and abolish
it. The funds released could be better
used for infrastructure, preservation of
the environment and farm
modernisation. Then Poland, for
example, could once again be the
breadbasket of Europe, instead of a
continued on p32
As economic and monetary integration in Europe approaches a
new era, CentrePiece invited two British politicians to give us
their very different views on the future of Britain in Europe.
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A raw deal for the 
Unemployment has long been one of Europe’s
biggest economic headaches: the experience in
most European countries differs markedly from that of the United
States. Yet, as David Blanchflower and Richard Freeman, both
associates of the CEP, explain, the employment problems of young
people in Europe have much in common with those in other industrial
countries. Their research suggests there are no quick fixes on offer.
y u g
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ne of the most striking features of the job market
in the 1990s is the scale of the problems which
young people face. In spite of more young people
staying on in education, and, indeed, more
working and getting education at the same time, employ-
ment prospects for the young right across the industrial
world are getting worse. Such developments have important
consequences for society. The question, ultimately, is
whether public policy can influence the future prospects for
young people.
Differences – and similarities
Of course, the exact nature of the problems faced differs
across countries, just as the way young people move from
school to work differs among the OECD economies. In
some countries, youths begin working while in school, shop
around in the job market after they graduate, and then settle
into a relatively permanent position. In the US, for instance,
a typical young person will have worked at seven or eight
jobs between the age of sixteen and twenty five, switching
among jobs in school, and making further changes after
leaving school. Elsewhere, there is a more structured transi-
tion from school to work; and youths take fewer jobs to
reach ‘permanent employment’. In Germany, Austria, and
Switzerland, apprenticeships move youths from school to
the industry in which they will find permanent work without
an extended period of time in other sectors. In Japan, firms
tend to recruit from particular colleges and universities or
from specific high schools; workers remain with their first
employer for long periods of time. In yet other countries,
youths rarely work while in school and are often jobless for
a long period after leaving school before obtaining a first job.
Their first job, though, is a relatively permanent one. Italy and
Spain – prior to the latter’s introduction of temporary
contracts – are examples of this pattern.
Throughout the OECD, young people have had greater
problems in the job market in the 1990s than their prede-
cessors had in earlier decades. In some countries, this
shows up in relatively high unemployment rates and low
ratios of employment to population. In others it takes the
form largely of reduced wages for young workers. Table 1
(page 22) shows that for young men aged eighteen employ-
ment participation rates have tended to fall and rates of
unemployment have risen in most countries. The trends are
similar for older age groups and for women, although the
levels are rather different.
At the same time, the proportion of young persons in educa-
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Why youth 
unemployment 
will be hard 
to reduce
tion (this includes schools, colleges and universities) has
increased. This is illustrated in Table 2 (overleaf). It is notice-
able that the UK has by far the lowest proportion of young
people in school than in any of the countries reported here.
It’s also worth noting that a considerably higher proportion of
those reported as being in education are likely to be in school
in Europe than is the case in the USA. Ultimately, fewer of
these people will obtain qualifications, especially degrees.
Table 3 (on page 23) shows another interesting recent
development. There has been an increase in all
countries in the proportion of the employed
who are simultaneously working and receiv-
ing some education. Once again the
trends are similar for women although
the levels are rather different.
It’s not difficult to come up with
explanations as to why youth
employment prospects have
deteriorated; the challenge is
to find the right answer, since only then will the implica-
tions for government policies be clear.
Too many young people?
Three explanations fall in the supply-side category. The first is
what was the predominant explanation of the job problems of
young people in the 1970s. As the baby boom generation
SURPLUS INFLE
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reached working age, the supply of young workers increased
relative to the supply of older workers, with what seemed to
be classical market effects on wages and or employment.
The large influx of young workers depressed the opportuni-
ties for a typical entering worker, causing either the wages or
chances of employment for young people to fall. 
This explanation has no relevance to the 1990s. In the past
two decades, the youth share of the population has fallen
noticeably in most OECD countries, as the baby boomers
aged and were replaced by smaller generations. If every-
thing else had stayed the same, the large drop in the size of
youth cohorts in the 1980s and 1990s should have raised
their employment or wages, or both, just as the large
increase in the size of youth cohorts in the 1970s lowered
wages and employment. It did not. The concordance of
declining employment to population rates and relative youth
wages, implies that everything else was not the same in the
1980s and 1990s. Detailed analysis of the link between the
relative number of youths and their economic position
relative to older workers up to the 1990s shows at 
most weak effects of demographic variables on the 
employment-population rate of youths. Perhaps the relatively
smaller cohorts of young people eased their labour market
difficulties, but not by enough to offset the other forces that
were at work in the youth job market.
Underqualified?
The claim that the education system is failing young people
is an often-heard explanation for youth job market problems.
But it does not fly. Young people in the 1990s have more
education than earlier generations had. Using data that
traces two age cohorts through time, those aged 16 in 1983
and those aged 16 in 1988, we have analysed school to
work transitions within countries through time. In most
countries the percentage participating in education at every
age for the 1988 cohort lies above the percentage for the
1983 cohort, implying that years in school are increasing. In
the US, where post-secondary education increased earlier
than elsewhere, the figures imply a stable proportion
enrolled in school as their major activity in the periods
covered. This evidence is consistent with data that show
increased enrolments in higher education in most countries,
including the US. The young today are likely to be more
educated than earlier generations who had lower unemploy-
ment rates. 
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Men at the top of the pay range saw virtually no drop
in their rates of pay and were able to increase their
earnings by working longer hours...
Note: OECD average is unweighted.
*1983  **1986  ***1993.
Source: Blanchflower and Freeman:
Growing into work
(CEP Discussion Paper No. 296, 1996).
Table 1 Changes in labour market status for 18 year old males
Employment/
Activity rate Population rate Unemployment rate %
Country 1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994
Australia 83.2 70.0 66.0 53.7 20.7 23.3
Belgium 26.3 14.5 18.2 9.8 30.9 32.1
Canada 60.3 52.9 44.0 43.3 27.0 18.1
Denmark 74.3 69.5 66.3 63.7 10.7 8.3
France 42.5 16.9 27.2 11.1 36.0 33.9
Germany 66.7 57.8 61.8 53.6 7.4 7.2
Greece 40.5 27.1 33.4 21.2 17.6 21.8
Ireland 61.8 39.8 43.5 28.4 29.7 28.7
Italy 43.0 27.8 30.8 18.7 28.4 32.6
Luxembourg 54.1 27.5 50.5 22.5 6.6 18.3
Netherlands* 36.9 52.0 26.3 44.0 28.7 15.4
Portugal** 69.7 44.1 57.9 39.6 17.0 10.1
Spain** 49.6 36.7 25.8 20.9 48.0 43.2
UK 80.0 71.1 56.0 57.4 26.2 19.3
US*** 59.9 54.9 46.7 43.8 22.0 20.3
OECD average 56.6 44.2 43.6 35.4 23.8 22.2
Table 2 Changes in the proportion of young 
men in education
Age 18 Age 22
Country 1984 1994 1984 1994
Australia 44.5 53.5 18.0 21.5
Belgium 72.0 78.3 35.4 34.3
Canada 58.3 76.0 23.2 33.1
Denmark 39.4 64.2 16.3 31.7
France 47.4 79.9 10.1 36.0
Germany 36.0 45.0 23.0 25.1
Greece 56.0 69.1 21.9 29.7
Ireland 41.0 59.7 11.3 20.7
Italy 55.1 66.5 23.2 27.5
Luxembourg 43.7 67.5 15.7 18.8
Netherlands* 66.9 75.0 33.2 43.3
Portugal** 34.8 59.8 19.6 31.5
Spain** 49.3 64.3 18.5 34.2
UK 26.7 31.7 11.3 12.8
US*** 61.6 64.7 19.7 23.5
OECD average 48.8 63.7 20.0 28.2
Notes: OECD average is unweighted. *1983  **1986  ***1993.
Source: Blanchflower and Freeman (1996).
Are young people not flexible enough? 
Another supply side explanation commonly advanced is that
young people are not flexible enough in their job search. The
wages they demand are too high and they are unwilling to
take low skill starting jobs and then shift to better jobs later.
We do not find much support for this explanation either.
The school-to-work transition can take the form of youths
entering the job market and obtaining relatively long-term
jobs; or it can be more of a job matching and shopping
process, in which youths enter and engage in a lengthy
period of search before settling down. Germany and Japan
are exemplars of labour markets in which young persons
enter the market and obtain relatively permanent jobs without
much job-switching or working during school. In the US and
Canada youths enter the market and change jobs readily
before settling down, and many youths work during school
and in summer vacations.  There are advantages and disad-
vantages to both models. But whichever is better, there is no
evidence in either of reduced mobility among youths, nor of
increased reservation wages that would suggest that the
young are unwilling to work. In the US, attachment to firms
has, if anything, fallen among young less skilled men, imply-
ing greater – possibly too great – mobility. And young
workers in virtually all countries are more mobile than older
workers.
Sectoral decline?
If you can’t explain something on the supply side, you don’t
have to be too much of an economist to know that you ought
to try the demand side of the market. There are three
demand side factors that might help explain youth job market
problems. One hypothesis is that the sectors of the
economy in which young people tend to work are in decline.
Has this been the case? In most countries youths work in
different economic sectors than adults; it’s not difficult to
calculate which sectors are youth-intensive. Youths are
disproportionately represented in hotels and restaurants
and wholesale, retail trade, and repair: all these sectors
are huge employers of young people. In Germany and
France, for instance, the two sectors employed 39% of all
young workers in 1994. When the youth workforce is
disaggregated by sex, two other industries are highly youth
intensive: construction, for men; and health, for women.
Indeed analysis shows that recently among men, there has
been an increased concentration of young men in ‘youth
intensive’ industries. In this sense, the 1980s and 1990s
have seen the development of a more bifurcated labour
market by age.
The uniformity of these patterns across countries is striking
and suggests that, differences in school-to-work transition
patterns notwithstanding, what happens to the youth labour
market depends critically on developments in a limited set
of sectors in all countries. Since in most countries youths
work in a distinct set of industries, it could be that some of
their labour market problems might be due to structural
shifts in the composition of employment against those
industries. If the share of employment in hotels and restau-
rants and wholesale and retail trade, where young workers
are found in disproportionate numbers, were falling, this
would adversely affect the movement of youths into job
markets. But in nearly all of the countries employment in
these sectors grew relative to total employment.
Analysis shows that in all of the EU countries except Belgium,
as well as in the US, Canada and Japan, the net effect of
changes in the share of employment across industries has
been to raise, not lower, the demand for young workers.
Since changes in industry mix should have improved the
employment prospects of youths, they offer no help in
explaining the observed worsening of outcomes for youths.
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...but the ten per cent of men on the lowest rates of pay
experienced a double whammy – cuts in the real rates of pay
per hour and in the number of hours worked.
Table 3 Changes in the proportion of employed young men who are in school
Age 18 Age 22 Age 26
1984 1994 1984 1994 1984 1994
Australia 41.7 43.9 14.9 18.0 12.6 12.8
Belgium 7.1 11.5 4.9 3.8 6.9 3.0
Canada 46.1 68.1 14.0 22.8 7.0 12.2
Denmark 23.9 50.8 6.4 15.9 5.1 7.0
France 1.9 15.6 1.9 9.4 1.7 6.9
Germany 5.8 12.0 2.0 5.8 2.0 6.7
Greece 5.8 5.1 2.0 2.7 1.1 1.7
Italy 2.1 2.6 2.4 3.0 2.2 1.7
Luxembourg 0.9 5.6 1.6 1.4 1.0 0.9
Netherlands* 23.7 55.1 13.7 25.6 12.5 7.4
Portugal** 10.2 16.6 7.9 10.2 2.1 8.7
Spain** 2.0 11.3 0.6 6.6 0.2 6.5
UK 14.6 21.9 6.6 7.9 3.9 5.1
US* 43.8 46.3 9.2 12.0 2.1 2.1
OECD average 15.7 25.1 6.1 9.9 4.2 5.6
Notes: as for Table 1.
Source: Blanchflower and 
Freeman (1996).
Too much pay?
When any group of workers is unemployed, economists
naturally ask whether their wages have recently 
risen, getting out of line with their productivity. This is
particularly the case for young workers or others whose
pay is low and might be affected by minimum wages. So
have youth wages risen relative to adult wages? Do rising
minimum wages explain the worsened youth employment
position?
There is a clear and uniform story about changes in 
youth wages over time. In virtually all OECD countries
workers in both the 16–19 and 20–24 age groups have
experienced declines in their earnings relative to older
workers throughout the 1990s. The magnitude and timing
of the fall differs across countries; but the direction of the
change does not. 
Of course, it may be that youth wages did not fall 
enough because of minimum wage interventions. This
question has been most extensively examined in the US,
where the real minimum wage fell sharply during the
Reagan Presidency and then increased modestly under
Presidents Bush and Clinton. The evidence suggests that
even the large reductions in the relative pay of lower wage
workers in the US were not been sufficient to improve their
employment position. On the contrary, the amount of time
worked by lower paid workers has fallen rather than risen.
We have examined the relation between pay and employ-
ment for workers aged 25–29 using the US 
Census of Population. Men at the top of the pay range saw
virtually no drop in their rates of pay and were able to
increase their earnings by working longer hours. But the
10% of men on the lowest rates of pay experienced a
double whammy – cuts in the real rates of pay per hour and
in the number of hours worked. Women fared better: right
across the earnings range, the number of hours worked
rose, and the cuts in real hourly earnings were small
compared with those of men. So despite substantial 
reductions in pay the amount of time worked by young 
men has not increased. For women, increases in hours
worked do not appear to have been brought about by cuts
in real earnings. 
Consistent with these results is the growing literature on
the relation between youth employment and minimum
wages in the US, UK, and France which show at most
modest job losses in response to mandated increases in
the minimum. In many cases researchers are unable to find
any loss of employment; and some have even found job
gains. The fact that the relative pay of youths fell across
countries at the same time that youth employment rates also
fell tells a similar story. One possible interpretation of all of
these results is that the data reflect a massively declining
demand for young workers. Nevertheless, there is little in
the evidence we have found to indicate that even greater
relative wage reductions would have significantly improved
the availability of work for the young.
The real explanation?
Since none of the explanations we’ve looked at so far helps
us much in explaining youth unemployment, solutions based
on tackling them – wage subsidies, extra training, encourag-
ing young people to stay out of the labour market by carrying
on with education – are unlikely to make great headway. A
more traditional explanation is that youth unemployment is the
‘squeaky wheel’ in the job market: that the young are at the
margin and thus especially sensitive to changes in the
economy as a whole.
The effect of fluctuations in the aggregate economy on
youths has long been an issue in analyses of the youth labour
market. The standard generalisation is that youth employ-
ment or unemployment is exceptionally sensitive to aggregate
economic fluctuations. No such clear generalisation has
emerged about the effect of the aggregate economy on youth
enrolment in school. We examined the impact of aggregate
economic forces on three overlapping classifications: the
percentage in school (regardless of employment status); the
School and job prospects are critical in the lives of young people. So it is 
not perhaps surprising that the worsening youth job market in the 1980s 
and 1990s brought unwelcome social consequences.
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Table 4 Death rates by suicide and self-inflicted 
injuries for men. 
(Death Rates per 100,000 persons)
Age
15-19 20-24 25-54
Country
Australia 1970 8.4 16.7 26.2
1992 19.6 34.6 26.3
Austria 1970 21.0 32.9 43.7
1992 15.7 31.2 35.6
Canada 1970 10.1 21.9 24.6
1992 20.1 29.0 27.3
France 1970 6.7 12.1 25.7
1992 6.7 20.7 37.5
Italy 1970 2.6 4.5 7.9
1990 3.3 8.3 10.5
Japan 1970 8.7 18.8 19.4
1992 5.3 15.3 25.9
Netherlands 1970 3.3 8.1 10.7
1992 4.6 12.5 17.0
New Zealand 1970 9.0 15.6 19.0
1992 27.7 52.2 28.7
Norway 1970 1.3 9.2 17.2
1992 18.0 37.2 24.3
Sweden 1970 10.2 25.4 41.3
1992 5.4 14.4 27.5
UK 1970 3.0 8.5 11.5
1992 6.4 16.9 17.8
US 1970 8.9 19.0 23.1
1991 18.0 25.4 24.0
West Germany 1970 15.7 24.6 34.0
1990 9.6 18.6 23.8
Source: World Health Organisation Statistical Database.
percentage employed (regardless of school status); and the
percentage unemployed. Using data on 17 OECD countries,
we estimated the effect of aggregate demand on the distrib-
ution of youths among each of the three states in turn. Pooling
all of the countries together, schooling is positively related to
unemployment, implying that increases in unemployment lead
to increased enrolments, but the diverse country results
gainsay any broad generalization. 
By contrast, there is no ambiguity in the effect of aggregate
economic conditions on the proportion of an age group
working or unemployed. When we pooled all the OECD
countries for which we had data, we found that an increase
in aggregate unemployment by 1 percentage point reduces
the employment rate of youths by 1.13 percentage points.
This implies that a 1 percentage point increase in unemploy-
ment reduces the probability that a young person is employed
by more than one point. Interestingly, the UK has one of the
highest impacts with an increase in aggregate unemployment
of 1% leading to a 1.8% fall in the employment rate of youths
and an enormous 2.4% increase in unemployment of male
youth. We found that as young people get older, the propor-
tion employed or unemployed becomes less sensitive to
aggregate economic conditions. This supports the generali-
sation that youth employment is exceptionally sensitive to
aggregate conditions.
The social consquences
School and job prospects are critical in the lives of young
people. So it is not perhaps surprising that the worsening
youth job market in the 1980s and 1990s brought unwelcome
social consequences. First, suicide rates increased. Table 4
(left) reveals a striking regularity in the rise of suicides among
young men in English-speaking countries: the US, Canada,
UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Eire. These countries have
had relatively large increases in earnings inequality and have
lower social safety nets than many other countries, although
any causal linkage is speculative. Rates of suicide among
young men have also risen in Norway, where earnings
inequality is small and the social safety net high. Only in
Japan, Austria, Sweden and West Germany did suicide rates
for both of the groups of young men reported in the table
decline: in these countries, unemployment rates over the
period in question were very low. 
Crime also increased. Most crimes are committed by the
young. So a good indicator is thus the rate of crime per person
in the crime-prone young age group, say 16–29. While there
are major problems in the crime statistics of all countries, as far
as it’s possible to be certain, crime rates have risen in the past
twenty to thirty years in most advanced countries. Across
countries, rates of crime tend to be higher in the US than in
Western Europe or Japan. But the US-Europe differences are
largely the result of higher rates of violent crime in the US.
Property crime rates differ only modestly among advanced
countries with, for instance, car thefts higher in France or
England and Wales than in the US in 1984.
What does differ across countries is the incarceration rate.
An extraordinary proportion of young men in the US are in
prison or jail. In 1993, 10% of 25–34 year old American men
were ‘under the supervision of the criminal justice system’,
meaning that they were in prison, or had been convicted and
given probation, or were on parole from prison. In 1993 one
man was incarcerated for every 50 men in the workforce, a
rate of 2%. Even in the UK, which has one of the highest
rates in western Europe, the figures were much lower:
60,000 men were in prison in 1996, 0.4% of the workforce.  
The difference in the size of the prison population reflects two
different ways of dealing with the decline in demand for low
skilled labour which has characterized most OECD countries
in the past two decades. In the US there are few benefits for
unemployed or poor men; real pay for low skill work has fallen
by 20% or so; jobs are scarce even at low wages, and
society deals with these lost souls through the criminal justice
system. In most EU countries there are substantial unemploy-
ment or social safety net benefits, and wages have not fallen,
so that it pays to wait for a job. 
Searching for a solution
Governments around the world have tried to mitigate the
impact of adverse labour market conditions by developing
‘training’ programs that have frequently been targeted on the
young. Examples include programs developed under the Job
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) in the US and the Youth
Opportunities Programme and Young Training Scheme in the
UK. Until recently, however, there has been little effort to
evaluate their effectiveness; and most attempts which have
been made have largely been confined to the US. Where
evaluation has been done appropriately – allowing for the
possibility that participants might well have succeeded
without the programme – the results have not been encour-
aging. Large scale government training programmes do not
appear to work and hence the tendency to scale them down
in the 1990s. No solution here.
Unless overall rates of unemployment are reduced, there is
little likelihood of an improvement in the job prospects for
young people. The most likely cause of youth unemployment
is the high overall rate of unemployment: unless that is
reduced, which may require faster economic growth than
most countries seem willing to accept, the position of youths
in the job market is unlikely to change in the near future. 
Unless overall rates of unemployment are reduced, there is little 
likelihood of an improvement in the job prospects for young people.
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On September 16, 1992, less than two years 
after Britain joined the exchange rate
mechanism of the European Monetary
System, the pound 
was forced out amidst
unprecedented turbulence on 
the foreign exchange markets. 
Guest Columnist Sir Alan Walters,
economic adviser to Margaret Thatcher
during much of the 1980s, reflects on 
the lessons of the crisis five years on.
As Talleyrand would have said about Britain’s entry intothe Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), it was worsethan a crisis, it was a crime.
Purpose and practice
The ERM was part of the European Monetary System
agreed between German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and
French President Valèry Giscard d’Estaing in 1978. Both
saw it as an essential first step towards a monetary union of
one sort or another. The French, as always the most skilled
negotiators in the EC, saw this as one way in which they
could achieve ‘symetrie’, which one translates as French
control over German monetary policy.
The ERM itself was widely interpreted as a ‘fixed’ exchange
rate system. It was thought to herald a ‘sea of stability’ in the
floating rates of the 1970s. But from its inception exchange
rates were ‘pegged’ rather than fixed: they were said to be,
in an obvious oxymoron, ‘fixed but flexible’. Exchange rates
were permitted to wobble in a band of plus or minus 2.25%
(6% in the case of Italy and, later, the UK) around a central
value. But if there was a fundamental disequilibrium, the
central value could, with the nominal agreement of the
participating governments and the presumption of support,
also be moved.
So much for the intent. The reality was that governments
were reluctant to recognise fundamental disequilibria, just as
they were under the aegis of Bretton Woods. With enormous
private capital movements, it was quite impossible to have a
considered devaluation or revaluation. The market could
calculate as well as treasuries and central banks whether the
parity was sustainable. And traders did not have to wait for
the bureaucratic processes of assessment and decision. 
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Black Wednesday:
five years on
The signs were enough: the rate of erosion of reserves, sky-
high interest rates to discourage capital flight, and so on.
Active traders would anticipate any move to make a killing.
This, of course, exacerbated the flight.
The founding fathers of the ERM never anticipated the
enormously disruptive private capital flows, partly because
until 1990 there were effective controls on capital
movements. With their dirigiste financial sectors, Germany
and France believed that the central banks could maintain
their chosen parities. But as international private capital
flows burgeoned, and capital controls were reduced and
eventually, in 1990, eliminated, so exchange rate policy
became more and more a game of cat and mouse... and the
speculating cat was almost always ahead of the mandarin’s
mouse.
The founding fathers also sought ‘symetrie’. As in all institu-
tions of the EC and the EU, they sought an equality between
nation states. But it was clear from the beginning that
Germany would dominate all other countries; the
deutschemark would rule o’er all.
The decision to stay out
Throughout the 1980s, although Britain was in the European
Monetary System, it did not participate in the ERM. Various
reasons were given; the common thread was that Britain
needed the flexibility accorded by a floating rate and should
not lash itself to the deutschemark mast. It was argued that
if there were shocks (such as a rise in oil prices) and one
needed to change the overall price level and the differential
between tradeable and non-tradeable goods, then it was a
good idea to allow one price, the exchange rate, to move
rather than go through the hassle and expense of negotiat-
ing virtually all prices individually. At various stages in the
past (notably 1926, 1965 and 1973) governments had tried
to negotiate restrictions on money wages and had failed and
fallen. The Thatcher government was anxious to avoid that
trap.
But the overwhelming reason for staying out of the ERM was
that, with Britain’s open and highly liquid capital markets,
there would be destabilising capital flows which would be
costly to deal with, through sterilised intervention, and which
would result in perverse monetary policies and, ultimately, a
collapse of the parity. On a personal note I should like to
record that I wrote a seven page brief on these issues for
the Prime Minister in November 1981. The argument in that
brief became known as the ‘Walters critique’.*
A caricature of the process is as follows:
Consider country G (for Germany) which enjoys zero
inflation and country B (Britain) that suffers from 10%
inflation. Let GÕs interest rate be 3% and BÕs 13%. The
exchange rate is 3 deutschemarks to the pound, and
sterling is depreciating at 10% a year. Now form an ERM
by pegging the exchange rate at 3DM, and suppose this
holds for a full year. At the prevailing interest rates, the
yield in B is 10% more than in G for maturities of less
than one year. So for these short maturities, capital will
flow to B from G. This will depress interest rates in B and
raise them in G. In principle, this flow from G to B will
continue until interest rates in B and G are the same Ð
say 6% for short term capital.
We note the essential perversity of monetary policy in
both B and G. B with her 10% inflation has negative real
short term interest rates (minus 4%) and receives an
enormous expansion in the money supply through
injection of foreign money. G has higher real rates 
(plus 6%) and the flight of capital to B puts downward
pressure on the money supply.
But as the end of the year approaches, these capital
flows are reversed. Traders anticipate the inevitable
devaluation of BÕs currency. In order to hold sterling over
the yearÕs end, they need to be compensated for the
expected 10% devaluation. So sterling interest rates over
the end of the year rise, and GÕs fall, as we see typically
where there is an imminent devaluation.
This whole process will not lead to lower inflation in B. 
But it will induce great instability. After the devaluation, 
with sterling at 2.7DM, there is no reason why the
process should not be repeated. It is inherently a 
destabilising process.
There are many variations on this general theme – one could
incorporate, for example, the fact that we do not know when
the devaluation is to take place, the use of bands for parity
tolerance, and so on. All these considerations are, however,
variations around the theme. The basic perversity and desta-
bilising forms do not change.
The British experience from 1987 to 1992 does not discredit
this analysis of events. Recall that in January 1987, the then
Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, pursued a policy of shadowing
the deutschemark at a parity of 3DM to the pound. Since
British interest rates were considerably above German
rates, there was a flood of money into London... so much so
that in February and March 1998, sterling went through its
roof. Interest rates were reduced to a low of 7.5% in mid-
1988, in spite of the mounting evidence of massive growth
in the money supply. By shadowing the mark, the Chancellor
hoped to ease Britain into the ERM; all he did, however, was
to generate a substantial inflation (‘headline’ inflation peaked
at over 10%) which, in 1989–90, required interest rates of
15% and a recession to subdue it.
Going in...
The ERM enthusiasts argued, or at least asserted, that
Britain would not have got into the 1989–90 pickle if they
had been firmly locked into the ERM. The media colum-
nists, the CBI, most Ministers and virtually all Conservative
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members of Parliament clamoured for Mrs Thatcher to
enter the ERM forthwith.
Although I was still adamant about the dangers of joining
such a club, one had to recognise political realities. As
adviser to the Prime Minister, I tried to do this in a brief on
the position to be taken at the Madrid meeting of the
European Council on June 15, 1989. I suggested that we
should join the ERM on certain conditions: first, there
needed to be a considerable reduction in inflation; second,
our European partners should eliminate both overt and
covert exchange controls; and finally, the single European
market should be completed. Although it was clear that
wholesale achievement of these conditions would not deal
with the fundamentals of capital flows and their destabilising
effects, I thought that it was the best sort of deal that could
be done.
Of course, none of these conditions were realised when, on
October 5, 1990, Mrs Thatcher yielded at last to the
pressures from the Chancellor, then John Major, her Cabinet
and the howling banshees of the media. We entered at a
central rate of 2.95DM, with 6% bands. Immediately the
problems of the ERM became apparent. We in Britain were
still deep in recession and required low interest rates to
generate recovery. In Germany, however, interest rates were
high as the Federal Republic aborbed the erstwhile German
Democratic Republic. So of course British interest rates had
to stay even higher. Germany really did call the tune of
monetary policy.
...turned sour
After a brief honeymoon period, by the summer of 1992 the
steady drip of the capital drain had persuaded many a
portfolio holder that this would soon become a flood. The
credibility of a central value of 2.95DM was severely dented
by the recession-related expansion of the budget deficit, the
very large increase in taxes and, in spite of high interest
rates, the capital flight and massive shorting of sterling
against the mark and the dollar. From various indicators, I
calculated that sterling would be bounced out of the ERM on
August 22. I did not, however, reckon with the enormously
costly defence of the indefensible: and so Chancellor
Lamont, with the agreement of the Prime Minister, John
Major, delivered our billions of reserves to those speculators
and fundholders who shorted sterling. The final curtain
came down on September 16, when all hell, and sterling,
broke loose. It was ‘decided’ to float rather than devalue to
a new central rate.
(The confusion of the Major ministers and the Bank of
England, the U-turns clumsily performed, are all the stuff of
common knowledge. The common boast of the
Conservative Party that they were far better at managing
public finances and the economy than the opposition was at
least open to question. I suspect this was still a major factor
in the election of 1997.)
Apologists for the ERM argued that Britain entered at the
wrong rate (and Sir Kit McMahon, a former Deputy
Governor of the Bank of England argued, for example ‘at the
wrong time and for the wrong reasons’). All would have
been well, it is said, if the rate had been lower – say 2.6DM.
I doubt this. As a counter example, when sterling shadowed
the mark in 1987–88 at 3DM, the rate was clearly too low. It
pushed through the ceiling from March 1988 onwards.
Informed opinion, in the shape of Sir Samuel Brittan,
suggested that the appropriate rate at the time was around
3.2 or 3.3DM. Many learned calculations of the fundamental
real equilibrium exchange rate came up with figures of that
order. Certainly one can agree that entry at a lower rate
would have changed the timing of subsequent events; but
with the differentials in inflation so large, the inevitable
capital flows would have done their damage.
There is no doubt that Black Wednesday played a large role
in reversing opinion on the sustainability and desirability of
the ERM type of ‘stability.’ Even more evidence poured in
with the crisis of the French franc and other currencies in
July 1993. True, with enormous German support and covert
exchange controls exerted by the banks, the French held
their parity: but that has had the effect of producing a severe
recession which continues to this day.
Since these two European crises, there have been a number
of examples of pegged exchange rate systems succumbing
to capital flows. Mexico in 1994, Thailand and the
Philippines in 1997, are the obvious examples. They can be
understood in terms of the simple analysis of my critique.
What cannot be predicted is the timing – but that is the
Achilles heel of much economic analysis.
It is now generally accepted that exchange rates should
either float or be absolutely fixed. As EMU lumbers ahead,
the governments involved are anxious to avoid another Black
Wednesday. From April 1998 onwards, they are likely to
choose ‘irrevocably’ fixed rates. But that, of course, is just
the word of politicians. We shall see what credibility the
market attaches to it... 
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The common boast of the Conservative Party
that they were far better at managing public
finances and the economy than the opposition
was at least open to question.
J
ust as on the Internet no one
can tell if you’re a dog, in the
weightless economy no one
should care if you earn your
living logged in from Dulwich. Or from
Silicon Valley for that matter. In the
modern weightless economy,
economic activity should disrespect
location, geography, and distance.
And, mathematically, the traditional
nation state is just a topological
deformation of physical distance. Pop
journalism is rife with stories of how
the twin forces of technology and
globalisation have fed off each other
and undermined the sovereignty of
traditional nation states. In appropriate
circumstances, it is natural and right
for the traditional nation state to fight
back – as it would be for any other
player in the modern economy.
Moreover, characteristics of the
weightless economy previously
described in this column and
elsewhere veer close towards
standard notions of public goods.
Indeed, in another guise, early
versions of these ideas were linked to
endogenous growth from spillovers
and externalities – then, private
actions of profit-seeking agents would
lead to under-investment and slower
growth than optimal. Shouldn’t that
give intervention-minded European
governments yet further weight to
step in? 
The nation state and its
economic geography
Sure, there was a time when
economics bowed to geography.
Farmers having grown their leeks (or
corn or rice or soy) could not rely on
neighbours buying all their produce.
Even the most intrepid, after all, eat
only so many leeks a year. Thus, leeks
had to be transported from wherever
they had just been produced to
wherever they would ultimately be
consumed. Given transportation
costs, someone – whether it be the
farmer, the consumer, or the
automagical workings of the
marketplace – will need to ensure that
the distribution of economic activity
across geographical space is
deliberate and efficient. Location
matters.
Swap ‘industrialists’ for ‘farmers’ and
‘earth-moving, chemicals-processing,
fabric-weaving, car-assembling,
house-building machinery’ – heavy
metal – for ‘leeks’, and the location
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Europe in the 
weightless economy
The weightless economy threatens the
traditional nation state and is rife with 
positive externalities for economic growth. 
Is this the signal for government intervention? 
In the third instalment of his regular 
column, Danny Tyson Quah looks at 
some European experiences.
From an economic perspective, as long as distance, trade tariffs, and other barriers keep the world
from being one seamless web, they also help define what nation states are and what nation states 
can do. Taxes on a citizenry extend only as far as where those citizens can be found, and no further.
problem simply scales up. For the
producer, there always remains the
tension between settling on the fertile
land, or near the coal mines or
waterways, and locating near the
customer or the distributors. For the
consumer, there always remains the
tension between working where one
is most appreciated and living where
one most appreciates. When
economic activity was less specialised
and one produced only for the
consumption of one’s family and
fellow villagers, such tensions were
correspondingly less pronounced. But
then, as economies grew and
technology allowed specialisation,
opposing forces in the balance grew
differentially in strength. The economic
landscape changed accordingly.
This is a simple story, but it helps us
understand the evolution of locational
geography from Nebuchadnezzar and
the Sumerians in the Tigris-Euphrates
basin all the way up through shopping
malls and industrial zones in the late
twentieth century. Large empires were
cobbled together and fought over,
canals built and continents separated,
to make an economic landscape just
so. In the US, first railways and then
automobiles and highways profoundly
influenced the economics and the
culture of American society.
In this simple analysis, when we
recognise that being close to
customers means different things
depending, say, on ruggedness and
inaccessibility of the surrounding
terrain, we factor into the calculation
the idea that relevant economic
distance means something a little
more subtle than that distance as the
crow flies. From there, it is a small
step to consider trade tariffs and trade
barriers across nation states – on top
of road-kilometres or air-miles – as
also forming part of a sensible
definition of economic distance.
But it is a two-way street when a
nation state’s policy actions directly
influence distance and geography.
From an economic perspective, as
long as distance, trade tariffs, and
other barriers keep the world from
being one seamless web, they also
help define what nation states are and
what nation states can do. Taxes on a
citizenry extend only as far as where
those citizens can be found, and no
further. Without free trade and mobile
capital and labour, factor-price
equalization fails, and the effective
minimum wage in one nation state will
differ from that in the next. Without the
possibility of cross-country swapping
of financial instruments, disparities in
risk-adjusted interest rates across
nation states need not be arbitraged
away. Collecting revenues for the state
is easiest and most efficient when tax
officials can just wander on down to
the closest port of entry, and sit there
counting the bales of cotton or casks
of wine that trundle from ship to dock.
Whither the nation state?
To continue the story, now replace
‘leeks’ with software, mathematical
algorithms, designs, and database
content. How do these travel?
The flip answer of course is very well,
thank you. Converted into logic bits of
zeroes and ones, these products
scurry across the globe practically
instantaneously. In package-switched
transit, they are indistinguishable from
any other zeroes and ones also
zipping through the networks. And,
without knowing how they are to be
put back together again, those zeroes
and ones that we sent are completely
meaningless to the unsuspecting on-
looking third party. However, when
reconstituted into their error-checked
manifestations at the receiver’s end,
they comprise exact copies of what
had been originally transmitted. 
These commodities are not 
icebergs that melt along the way 
in transportation. Neither are they
objects that a fiscal authority can
easily tote up and impose a fiscal
burden on – to tax just digital bits,
independent of what value those bits
carry, violates every sensible principle
of public finance I know. 
It is a naïve but natural extension of
this reasoning to conclude from this
that the nation state will wither away.
In this reasoning, the nation state, as
we know it, will soon become neither
necessary nor viable.
Stories abound, some probably
apocryphal, of how modern
communications technology has
altered power relations between
governments and those they control.
A 2400-baud modem or two, judicially
distributed around Czechoslovokia,
surely helped to communicate,
organise, and coordinate in 1989 –
with the heavy hand of the Communist
state too unhip to understand how
those instruments of new technology
might matter.
Now, if anything, the nation state
pokes its head into everything having
to do with new technology. The US
government auctioned off the radio
spectrum (someone had to), and –
after consulting the best economists
in the business on how to do this –
actually did a pretty good job, all
agree. Drawing on the example of the
government’s success at building
national highways, the federal
government has also looked into
constructing analogous pipeways for
transmitting those digital bits of
information.
It is unclear that private enterprise
could not do by itself a pretty good job
on this. Building highways when only
national governments had the clout to
amass the necessary resources is one
thing. Crowding out what profit-
seeking private agents can now do
quite willingly is another. Already it is a
private consortium that provides much
of the world’s satellite communications
services via high-altitude geostationary
orbit. Separately, Motorola and
Teledesic (the latter in collaboration
with Microsoft and Boeing) have been
working on putting in place alternative
low-orbit satellite service for video and
voice communications. Having a global
range, as any such operation must do,
involves the delicate task of getting the
approval of a sufficiently large coalition
of different sovereign countries. It is
informative that the bloc unified in
favour of these operations comprised
mostly the poorer emerging countries,
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arrayed against the Europeans and
Japanese. Half the world’s population
still live in countries with less than one
telephone per 100 inhabitants – there
are more telephone lines in Tokyo
alone than in all of the African
continent. Here, profit-seeking private
enterprise might well do a good job of
bringing high-tech to the poor –
indeed, in this regard, why should
high-tech be different from 
anything else?
However, in the US the outstanding
example of nation state intervention in
these matters has been on the issue
of privacy of those logic bits whizzing
around communications channels.
Debate surrounding the Clipper Chip
– key-escrow encryption technology –
has been heated, with the federal
government seeking to retain the
technical ability to decrypt every
conceivable communication, whether
it be by voice phone or data
transmission. Opponents credibly
organised against big-brother
government. The right to free (i.e.,
uncensored) communication is always
tricky for a government to challenge,
even if the challenge is more imagined
than real.
Where does Europe slot 
into the Net?
Governments could, of course, do
worse. European information society
initiatives (the Information Society
being the EU counterpart to the US
National Information Infrastructure, or
to the less nationalistic and thus more
universal ‘information superhighway’)
abound, and some of these projects
will probably do good. Now that 80%
of the new jobs created in Europe in
the last five years have been
recognised as information-related,
here’s where someone might think
European government resources
could go on pump-priming stimulus,
killing two birds – furthering modern
technology and smoothing out
sluggish, premodern, Eurosclerotic
labour markets – with one stone. 
Everyone should, of course, welcome
any reallocation of resources into
what are clearly growth sectors and
away from moribund declining
economic activities. But private agents
do that well. Why get in their way and
take away entrepreneurial
opportunity? Such government
interventions are in sharp contrast to,
say, the US where, after early war-
related beginnings, all high-tech
development valued by consumers
has been carried forward by profit-
seeking private enterprise. Being
contrary is, of course, no guarantee of
error, but then neither does it assure
success.
In the early 1990s, the French
government and the European
Community poured US$120m into the
Advanced Computer Research
Institute (ACRI), newly established in
Lyons. One goal, presumably, was to
try to grow some of that same
creative fire igniting California’s
Silicon Valley. The ACRI paid top
prices to hire managers, scientists,
and engineers quickly. Staff surplus to
requirement were taken on, partly
because ESPRIT funding (ESPRIT
was the European Union’s principal
programme for information-technology
Research and Development subsidies)
was based on staffing targets – but
surely over-manning could do no
harm. And it’s an easy way to create
jobs.
The ACRI project went nowhere. No
product ever came to market; the
Institute went bankrupt in six years. Its
closest global competitor, Convex
Supercomputer in the US, brought
out its own machine in half the time
and for a quarter of what ACRI spent.
This example is instructive. Why,
when the new technology is
geography-blind, do places like
Silicon Valley, Massachusetts and
Utah’s software concentration
between Salt Lake City and Provo
succeed so spectacularly, while
others – with arguably better financial
support and government backing to
boot – fail?
First, all those successful regions in
the US are close to top universities
churning out highly-motivated,
success-driven software and
hardware engineers; industry in the
new technology relentlessly feeds off
this creativity and brainpower. By
contrast, in a 1996 survey, 50% of
France’s youth said they wanted to be
civil servants. Sure, it doesn’t matter
that you’re in Bangalore, India,
bouncing off a satellite your code
destined for a software house in
California – but you have to want to
do it, and someone had to find you as
you were graduating from university in
the first place.
Second, all the successes began
lean, mean, and hungry. No one had a
luxurious direct line to an ongoing
supply of resources with which you
could buy unneeded equipment and
people. If you don’t give people what
they want, you’re out of the game.
Start over.
The binding constraint in this business
is the shortage of human capital –
whether it is for providing artistic
design and content or for cutting code
or for laying tracks on silicon. This is
why in the 1990s in the US real
wages have risen 13–20% for
programmers, while the median wage
has instead fallen; why US high-tech
headhunters scour the globe for
skilled software engineers; and why
high-tech companies consider the
shortage of human talent the greatest
potential threat to successful, ongoing
growth in their industry – more than
any problem on the demand side for
their products.
Unleashed, European private industry
does very well in the global
competitive weightless-economy
market place. Nokia in Finland and
Ericsson in Sweden continue to
dominate the world in cellular global
telephony. It might, of course, seem
strange to think of ‘Ericsson of
Sweden’ since Ericsson employs
17,000 engineers in 40 research
centres distributed across 20
countries in the world.  It has 90,000
employees in total, active in over 130
countries. After designers in Australia
and England have worked to their
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Utah’s software concentration between Salt Lake City and Provo succeed so spectacularly, while
others – with arguably better financial support and government backing – fail?
persevere in its EMU folly, because
postponement means chaos and the
investment in misery has been too
great to suddenly admit that it’s all
been the terrible mistake it really is.
How should Britain respond?
Schadenfreude is permitted after years
of excessive budget contributions,
gaping trade deficits and losing jobs
and business to Europe while being
lectured as bad Europeans. Yet it must
be supplemented by the determined
pursuit of our own interests. Two
decades of dear money and overvalua-
tion have shrunk an industrial base on
which all still depends. Only cheap
money and a competitive exchange
rate can repair the damage, boost
growth and make production 
profitable in this country. We pursue
that or we fail.
Europe’s problem is what it can
rescue from self-inflicted folly. To
involve ourselves in that, or try to lead
them out of it, is to abandon British
substance for Euro-shadow. New
Labour’s job, however selfish or
uncommunautaire, is to rebuild an
economy which can pay its way in 
the world, generate the jobs and
economic growth its people need, 
and maximise their living standards. 
All else is distraction.
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poor supplicant for 
our largesse.
Rather than resist change – as the
victory of Lionel Jospin suggests the
French electorate wants to do – the
process of adjustment needs to be
speeded up. If the British began to
push effectively, there would be allies.
Our experience is that a lightly-
regulated market economy brings the
greatest gain to its people. Our 
politicians should become
missionaries. Mr Blair paraded his
admiration of Margaret Thatcher to the
voters and won: now he should
promote her ideas to a wider
audience. However he might dress
them up, he would find a ready
audience in Europe. 
Austin Mitchell Edwina Currie
satisfaction on an Ericsson blueprint,
that design plan is simply and
transparently made available to a
factory in China for final production.
The logic chips in their excellent
telephones are just as likely to be
designed in Nice using software tools
developed by Ericsson in Houston,
produced in Japan and Dallas, and
tested in Taiwan. But, unquestionably,
Ericsson remains a Swedish
company. Similarly, ‘Nokia of Finland’
employs more than 34,000 people in
45 countries.
Psion in the UK is widely recognised
to make the world’s best handheld
computers. About 40% of the world’s
most successful video games have
been written and designed by British
programmers. The same kind of
freewheeling creative genius that
made Douglas Adams’s Hitch-hikerÕs
Guide to the Galaxy such a runaway
success will probably carry over to
his The Digital Village, exploring
online entertainment. In France,
Gemplus, founded by engineers out
of Thomson Semiconductor,
developed the first microprocessor-
equipped smart card and, in the
process, launched a billion-dollar
industry, of which it still owns more
than a third. Over 90% of the world’s
smart cards are currently in use in
Europe, although estimates are that
US consumption of them will grow
dramatically in the coming decade.
European governments, like all others,
must recognize that success in the
weightless economy comes from
letting winners emerge, and getting
out of their way when they do so. 
It’s the same silver bullet as in the
regular economy. Even if no one
cares that you’re logged in from
Dulwich, what you’re doing had better
be useful and valued.
continued from pages 18Ð19
Austin Mitchell is Labour MP 
for Grimsby.
Edwina Currie was Conservative MP for 
Derbyshire South. She is now a writer 
and broadcaster.
POLITICS SPECIAL:
Britain and Europe
Danny Tyson Quah is Director of the 
CEP’s National Economic Performance
Programme, and Professor of Economics 
at the LSE. 
http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~dquah/
continued from page 31
“EducationEducationEducation”Tony Blair
New publications 
from the Centre for 
Economic Performance
Essential reading for 
everyone interested in the 
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of the skill levels of their own population in
relation to those of key competitors.
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